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"A person who is unable to pay the costs of court, because
of his poverty and lack of means, may prosecute or defend
a judicial proceeding . . . in any trial or appellate court
without paying the costs in advance, or as they accrue, or
furnishing security therefor." (Emphasis added.)
Article 5185 expressly provides that the party permitted
to litigate without the prepayment of costs is entitled to the
"issuance and service of subpoenas." It also expressly includes
certain services about which there otherwise might be some
doubt as to whether they would be included in "costs of court,"
such as the services of a notary or other public officer in issuing
certificates and certifying copies of notarial acts and public
records. But there can't be the slightest doubt that witness
fees and expense allowances are included in this term. Yet two
appellate courts of Louisiana saw in the deletion of the repetitious word "witnesses" a clear legislative intent to withdraw
from impoverished litigants their right to the free use of witnesses which they have enjoyed for a half-century. This is the
strict construction which courts usually reserve for criminal
statutes; and certainly not the liberal interpretationwhich the
16T
code itself calls for.
The rule of the Hillebrandt cases presents no particularly
acute problem, as its legislative reversal will be a simple matter.
The real threat posed by these decisions is a judicial attitude
which regards the deletion of a single word, or any editorial
change of language, as necessarily indicating a clear legislative
intent to change the law. This makes the task of legislative
revision both difficult and dangerous.
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Dale E. Bennett*
COURT'S JURISDICTION UNAFFECTED 'BY ILLEGAL ARREST

In State v. Green' a defendant prosecuted for unlawful sale
of narcotics urged the ingenious argument, by a motion to quash
167. "The articles of this Code are to be construed liberally, and with due
regard for the fact that rules of procedure implement the substantive law, and
are not an end in themselves." LA. CODE oP' CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 5051 (1960).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 244 La. 80, 150 So. 2d 571 (1963).
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the bill of information, that he had been seized upon a defective
warrant of arrest. In disposing of this procedural objection,
the Louisiana Supreme Court applied the well-established rule
that when a court has jurisdiction over a defendant who is
physically before it on a criminal charge, the illegality of the
arrest by which he was brought before the court is immaterial.
Although no previous Louisiana cases have passed upon this
issue, the rule applied had been "recognized and approved
throughout the United States. ' 2 In an analogous situation where
a defendant had been kidnapped and illegally brought before a
Michigan court, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
federal district court's ruling that the state court had power to
try the defendant "regardless of how presence was secured."
"Due process of law is satisfied," according to Justice Black,
"when one present is convicted of crime after having been fairly
apprised of the charges against him and after a fair trial in
accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards."8 The
fact that the defendant's presence before the court was illegally
procured does not violate due process. The illegal arrest in
Green, like the kidnapping of the defendant from a state of
asylum, carry penal and civil sanctions; but it does not bar the
state from prosecuting the person before it.
A very different situation is presented where illegallyobtained evidence is introduced at the defendant's trial. To allow
such evidence has been held, in Mapp v. Ohio,4 to be so incom-

patible with fair trial procedures as to constitute a denial of due
process.
EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO LAWFUL ARREST

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Mapp v.
Ohio5 that "due process" requires state courts to exclude evidence that has been illegally seized by peace officers, has necessitated a careful review and understanding of the law governing
search and seizure. The law governing the issuance and execution of search warrants is rather fully stated.0 However, the
rules govening searches without a warrant, but incidental to
a lawful arrest, have been developed almost exclusively by court
decisions. We may start with the well-recognized general prin2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Id. at 90, 150 So. 2d at 574, citing cases.
Frisbie v. Collins, 242 U.S. 519 (1952).
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Ibid.
LA. R.S. 15:41-46 (1950).
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ciple that "a search may be conducted lawfully without a warrant if it is incidental to a lawful arrest."'7 This rule does not,
however, authorize a general search for evidence of crime, and
is generally limited to a search for the fruits or instrumentalities of the crime for which the arrest was made. However,
if that search incidentally reveals evidence of another unrelated
crime, such evidence may be properly seized.8 In State v. Cade9
police, while making lawful arrests for battery, took possession
of a blackboard which was openly displayed in the building. In
holding that the blackboard was admissible in evidence in a
criminal anarchy trial, the court stressed the fact that the
seizure "was a reasonable one incident to a lawful arrest."' 10
The test for proper seizure and admissibility appears to be
whether the seizure was a direct and natural consequence of
the arrest or of a search properly incidental thereto." While
a lawful arrest would not authorize a general ransacking of the
premises for evidence, it will validate the seizure of property
which is in clear view of the arresting officer when he made
the arrest; and this is true even though the property is evidence
of a crime distinct from that for which the arrest was being
made. In short, the officer is not expected to close his eyes and
ignore such evidence of crime.
State v. Pennington12 applied the general rule that an individual's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures may be waived when consent is unequivocally and voluntarily given. In Pennington the voluntary nature
of the defendant's consent to a search of his house was established by the fact that he had willingly permitted and assisted
in locating stolen material in the mistaken belief that the police
would accept his story that the goods had been innocently received by him in payment for an automobile. A different situa7. Ker v. California, 83 Sup. Ct. 1623 (1963). Accord, State v. Ajar, 243
La. 946, 149 So. 2d 400 (1963); and State v. Calascione, 243 La. 993, 149
So. 2d 417 (1963) where arrests made on reasonable ground to believe that the
defendant was a narcotic violator and a search for narcotics (the fruits or instrumentality of the crime) were upheld.
8. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) where federal officers, incidental to an arrest for mail fraud, searched the house extensively for cancelled
checks by which the fraud was committed, and incidentally found evidence of another federal crime for which the defendant was ultimately convicted. Seizure
of the evidence was held reasonable and proper.
9. 244 La. 534, 546, 153 So. 2d 382, 387-88 (1963).
10. Id. at 549, 153 So. 2d at 388, citing United States Supreme Court cases
directly in point.
11. Abel v. United States, 363 U.S. 217 (1960).
12. 244 La. 650, 153 So. 2d 876 (1963).
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tion would have been presented if the defendant had merely
complied with the officer's request to permit a search of the
premises. In such a situation the official request is generally
considered as a form of coercion and the consent would not be
treated as voluntary.18 It is usually advisable for the officer
to procure a written consent to the search and to include a showing that the defendant had been informed of his right to refuse
permission for the search.
JURY VENIRES -

DISCRIMINATION

Pierre v. Louisiana14 clearly announced the rule that the
"equal protection" requirement of the United States Constitution applies to the selection and composition of the grand jury
which returns the indictment, as well as to the petit jury which
tries the case. Thus careful avoidance of racial discrimination
is important in all phases of jury selection. Where cases involving Negro defendants are to be considered by the grand
jury and brought to trial, the judge often admonishes the jury
commission to be careful to give full consideration to eligible
Negroes and to be sure to provide fair representation of the
colored race on the venires and jury lists. Such conscientious
admonitions and jury commission operations have sometimes
been urged to constitute a violation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
statement in the landmark United States Supreme Court case of
Cassel v. Texas, that "The basis of selection [of jurors] cannot
consciously take color into account."' 15 Mr. Justice Reed similarly
stated, "an accused is entitled to have charges against him considered by a jury in the selection of which there has been neither
inclusion nor exclusion because of race."' 16 Such contentions
were clearly and logically answered by Justice McCaleb in
State v. Green.'1 It is inevitable that the jury commissioners
will be conscious of the color line, and they should not be charged
with fault in making a forthright effort to provide adequate
13. Id. at 657, 153 So. 2d at 879, citing cases in point.

14. 306 U.S. 354 (1939).
15. 339 U.S. 282, 295 (1950).
16. Id. at 287.
17. 221 La. 713, 726, 60 So. 2d 208, 212 (1952). "It would be fallacious,
we think, to hold that, because jury commissioners, being conscious of the necessity of giving consideration to members of the colored race, as well as to those
of other races, in the selection of all juries in order to comply with the guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, have purposely included Negroes on a jury panel, their forthright action constitutes discrimination
in the absence of a showing that was a planned limitation upon the number of
Negroes to be chosen." (Emphasis added.)
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Negro representation. While it is not necessary to afford a
full mathematical proportion of Negro veniremen, 8 the purposeful inclusion of a token number of Negroes on the various jury
lists would constitute a violation of the "equal protection" requirements, as interpreted in Cassel.
State v. Mack19 further clarifies the pattern as to those jury
commission procedures which will meet "equal protection" requirements. In Mack the trial judge's written instructions to
the jury commission had clearly admonished them that they
should not "take into consideration the race of a prospective
juror in passing on his qualifications," and should not "exclude
any Negro because of his race." Pursuant to these instructions
"1,000 names were drawn from the voting registration rolls
according to a non-discriminatory formula of taking each
twentieth or twenty-second name on the roll. From these the
Jury Commission made eliminations because of disqualifications,
thereby reducing the number to 835. In these eliminations the
Commission made no discrimination because of race. The pool
of 835 names included 124 Negroes. From this pool the Jury
Commission drew indiscriminately 300 names for the general
venire and 100 names for the tales jury box."' 20 Four Negroes
were included among the twenty names selected for the grand
jury list. Three Negroes were drawn for grand jury service and
one claimed his statutory exemption as a school teacher. Official
census statistics did not indicate that the registered voters' list
had been used as a means of limiting the number of Negro
veniremen. 21 The burden of establishing contention that there had
been a "planned limitation" of the number of Negro veniremen
rests on the defendant.2 2 In upholding the trial court's ruling
that the defendant has failed to establish racial discrimination,
the Supreme Court stated that the court was not required to
set aside an indictment "because members of a defendant's race
have been intentionally included in the grand jury list. Such a
rule," declared Justice Sanders, "would make it virtually impossible to legally impanel a grand jury under a system of selection which requires an investigation of competency and a weigh18. State v. Pierre, 198 La. 619, 3 So. 2d 895 (1941) ; State v. Dorsey, 207
La. 928, 22 So. 2d 273 (1945), discussed 6 LA. L. REv. 660 (1946).
49. Mintie v. Biddle, 15 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1926).
20. Id. at 379, 144 So. 2d at 367.
21. The official 1960 census showed that the parish had a population of 51,657,
of which 14,781 were Negroes; and that the registered voters numbered 21,023,
of which 4,427 were Negroes.
22. Id. at 378, 144 So. 2d at 366, citing Louisiana and federal decisions.
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ing of qualifications. Under such a system, knowledge of a
prospective juror's race on the part of the Jury Commission
is inevitable." 28
A serious practical problem is presented by a recent United
States Fifth Circuit Court decision in Collins v. Walker',21a
wherein a forthright effort to include an ample number of
Negroes on the grand jury was held to be a violation of the
Negro defendant's constitutional rights as stated in Cassell v.
Texas. The jury commission had placed six (of twenty) names
on the grand jury list, and five (of twelve) Negroes had served
on the grand jury which indicted Collins. In Collins the jury
commission had erred in placing too many Negro names on
the grand jury list.- It would appear that a violation of the
constitutional rights of equal protection should be based upon
some real probability of injury, rather than a literal adherence
to the formula that "the basis of selection cannot consciously
take color into account." The probability of harm was rather
tenuous in Collins, and Judge Rives advanced arguments which
were admittedly "opposite and paradoxical." On the one hand
he expressed a fear that the inclusion of an over-proportinate
number of Negro jurors on the Collins grand jury list might
mean "a corresponding systematic exclusion of Negroes from
the remaining venires." This solicitude that a sufficient number
of Negro names will remain on the general venire list for future
cases is difficult to reconcile with the court's fear that Negro
jurors will not afford the Negro defendant a fair trial by reason
of "the sometimes over-ready compliance of members of the race
of the accused." On rehearing, the original opinion was withdrawn but the court still posited its reversal of the conviction
largely on the ground that Negro names had been "purposely
included" in the grand jury list. The decision on a rehearing
may not be on as broad a base as the original opinion, but it
still poses a serious practical problem for conscientious jury
commissions. This problem will be more fully discussed, with a
complete analysis of its practical implications, in the fourth
issue of this review.
23. Id. at 385, 144 So. 2d at 369. Accord, State v. Collins, 242 La. 704, 718,
138 So. 2d 546, 551 (1962) where the jury commissioners had been "given general instructions to always be sure that there was adequate representation of the
races" on jury venires.
23a. United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit, No. 20537 (Dec. 6,
1963), setting aside a conviction which had been affirmed by the Louisiana Supreme Court, State v. Collins, 242 La. 704, 138 So. 2d 546 (1962), rehearing
granted March 1964.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

-

[Vol. XXIV

JOINT DEFENDANTS

In major felony cases each defendant is entitled to twelve
peremptory challenges, and the state to twelve for each defendant. 24 In State v. Sevin 5 four defendants had been jointly indicted and were entitled to exercise forty-eight peremptory challenges. When a nolle prosequi was entered as to one of the
defendants the total number of authorized peremptory challenges was reduced to thirty-six. Prior to the nolle prosequi
the defendants had jointly exercised thirty-six peremptory
challenges without designating who was exercising the challenge.
A question was presented as to whether all of the thirty-six
challenges were chargeable against the remaining three defendants, thus exhausting their authorized peremptory challenges.
The Supreme Court handled this complicated and somewhat
baffling problem with Solomon-like sagacity, thus establishing
a clear pattern for future cases. Justice Summers pointed out
that the thirty-six challenges already exercised should be equally
allocated among the co-defendants (then four) who jointly exercised the challenges. This meant that twenty-seven (nine for
each defendant) were chargeable against the three remaining
defendants. "At that time they were jointly entitled to an additional nine, or separately they were each entitled to three additional peremptory challenges.

' 26

The logic and clarity of the

court's disposition of the novel situation presented in Sevin
will simplify the handling of similar future cases.
TIME LIMITATIONS

Article 8 of the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure provided
that a criminal prosecution must be instituted within one year
after the commission of the offense had been "made known"
to the appropriate judge, district attorney or grand jury. The
1960 time limitations law 27 eliminated the troublesome made-

known test and provides time limitations which run from the
commission of the offense-a time that can be clearly and
easily determined. The new time limitations are necessarily
longer than the former general one-year period which did not
begin to run until the prosecution had actual or constructive
notice of the defendant's crime. A problem has thus arisen as
24.
25.
26.
27.

LA. R.S. 15:354 (1950).

243 La. 1023, 150 So. 2d 1 (1963).
Id. at 1030, 150 So. 2d at 3.
La. Acts 1960, No. 25, enacting LA. R.S. 15:7.1-7.12 (Supp. 1962).
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to whether application of these longer time limitations to crimes
committed before the 1960 statute was ex post facto. If the oneyear time limitation had already run before the enactment of
the 1960 statute, it would have operated as a grant of immunity.
Thus the legislature could not deprive defendants of the benefit
of that immunity by extending the period of limitations. 28 A
different situation was presented in State v. Ferrie,29 where
the one-year period was running, but had not been completed,
when the statute extending the misdemeanor time limitation
to two years went into effect. In holding that the institution
of the prosecution within two years after the commission of
the crime was timely, the court applied the longer 1960 time
limitation.
The governing distinction is clearly and succinctly pointed
up in a statement quoted by Justice Summers.
"'Where a statute extends the period of limitation, the extension applies to offenses not barred at the time of the
passage of the act, so that a prosecution may be commenced
at any time within the newly established period though the
original period of limitation had then expired. Such a statute,
however, cannot operate as to offenses which were barred
at the time of its enactment, because that would make the
statute ex post facto.' "30
This distinction was further supported by a special applicability
clause of the new time limitations law which expressly excepted
offenses where "the institution of which has already been barred
by the prescriptions heretofore established by R.S. 15:8." (Emphasis added.)
LONG FORM INDICTMENTS

Under article 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 81
which states the general long form indictment formula, the indictment "must state every fact and circumstance necessary to
constitute the offense. . . ." While this does not necessitate a
spelling out of the details of the crime,8 2 it does call for a statement of facts establishing all elements of the crime, i.e., any
28. Moore v. State, 43 N.J.L. 203, 228 (1881), providing a fine discussion of
the vested legislative immunity created when a time limitation has run.
29. 243 La. 416, 144 So. 2d 380 (1962).
30. Id. at 425, 144 So. 2d at 383, quoting from 15 AM. Jura. CRIMINAL LAW
j 342 (1938).
31. LA. R.S. 15:227 (1950).
32. 16 LA. L. RaV. 342 (1956) ; 19 LA. L. REV. 409-10 (1959).
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required specific intent or knowledge, 83 the act, the criminal
consequence, and any required special fact or circumstance.
Thus, in State v. Smith84 an information for obstructing public
passages8 5 and disturbing the peace 6 was held insufficient because of its failure to specify facts and circumstances establishing every element of those offenses. Chief Justice Fournet
pointed out 87 that the offenses charged "are not among those
set out in Article 235... of the Code of Criminal Procedure...,
permitting the use of the short form in the drafting of accusations in certain well-understood and well-defined crimes, and
that portion of this article authorizing the charging of a defendant by using only the 'name and article number' of the
'38
offense has been declared null and without effect.
Where criminal statutes are couched in general language
covering a wide variety of criminal activity, informations which
merely track the language of the statutes do not provide adequate basic information, and have been characterized as doing
no more than charging "a conclusion of law."891 Where, however,
the charge is brought under a more specific statute, such as
forgery or simple kidnapping, 4 it is sufficient to follow the
language of the statute, and the defendant can secure further
details of the crime through a bill of particulars. In Smith the
charge of "obstructing public passages" was a mere "conclusion of law" for it did not even purport to track the language
of the statute violated; in view of the broad nature of the definition of that crime, however, a tracking of the language of the
statute would probably still have been insufficient. The second
charge of "disturbing the peace" was also defective, in that it
omitted an essential element of the crime, i.e., that the public
congregation was "with intent to provoke a breach of the peace"
or that it was "under circumstances such that a breach of the
peace may be occasioned thereby." If the breach of the peace
charge had fully followed the provisions of R.S. 15:103.1, it
33. Of. Where a crime only requires a general criminal intent, the indictment
need not allege that the act was "intentionally" done, LA. R.S. 15:234 (1950).
34. 243 La. 656, 146 So. 2d 152 (1952).
35. LA. R.S. 14:100.1 (1950).
36. Id. 14:103.1.
37. 243 La. 656, 659, 146 So. 2d 152, 153 (1952).
38. Citing State v. Straughan, 229 La. 1039, 87 So. 2d 523 (1956), noted, 17
LA. L. Rev. 232 and 406 (1956).
39. State v. Varnado, 208 La. 309, 23 So. 2d 106 (1945), holding a gambling
charge inadequate where it followed the broad language of the multifarious gambling article without specifying which of the many forms of gambling had been
committed.
40. State v. Green, 231 La. 1058, 93 So. 2d 657 (1957).
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would appear that a sufficiently definite charge would have
been stated. The crime of disturbing the peace by public congregations is very completely set forth and specified in the statute.
Even then it is always best to play safe and include a plain,
concise, and definite statement of the essential facts constituting
all elements of the offense charged.
PRESENCE OF DEPARTMENT

The common law rule, that in a felony trial the defendant's
presence is required at every important stage of the proceedings,
is well established by Louisiana jurisprudence. 41 The calling,
examination and impaneling of the jury is clearly an important
stage of the trial.42 State v. White43 stated a logical application,
and possible extension of this rule. In White the judge determined, after the trial was under way, that one of the regular
jurors was incompetent to serve by reason of conflict of interest; so the judge discharged the juror and ordered an available
alternate juror to serve. All this was done in chambers and out
of the presence of the defendant. In holding that reversible error
had been committed, the Supreme Court stated that "once a
juror has been qualified as competent to serve and sworn- all
in the presence of the defendant - he cannot thereafter be disqualified as incompetent to serve unless the defendant is present."' 44 In a vigorous dissent Justice Hawthorne drew a distinction between the original examination and selection of the jury
and alternate jurors (where the defendant has a clear right to
be present), and the situation in the instant case where one
of the original jurors is determined to be incompetent and replaced by an alternate juror. All of these jurors, both regular
and alternate, argued the dissent, were selected and qualified
in the defendant's presence. The majority opinion, however, is
posited on the sound idea that the discharge of a regularly
selected jury is also a matter of significance which should be
determined in the presence of the defendant.
DELAY IN SENTENCING; SENTENCE BY SUBSTITUTE JUDGE

Article 521 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 45 requires a
41. State v. Thomas, 128 La. 813, 55 So. 415 (1911) ; State v. Pope, 214 La.
1026, 39 So. 2d 719 (1949).
42., State v. Thomas, 128 La. 813, 55 So. 415 (1911).
43. 244 La. 585, 153 So. 2d 401 (1963).
44. Id. at 607, 153 So. 2d at 401.
45. LA. R.S. 15:521 (1950).
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twenty-four hour mandatory delay in the imposition of sentence,
thus assuring the defendant of this minimal period for the filing
of his motion for a new trial. This period is often inadequate
for a proper pre-sentence investigation. Also, the defense may
need additional time to prepare its motion for a new trial. An
important flexibility in sentencing is possible under a concluding proviso which vests the trial judge with authority to delay
sentencing beyond the twenty-four hour period. The judge's
authority to delay the imposition of sentence has been very
broadly construed. Thus, in State v. Rider,46 sentence was
validly imposed almost two years after the defendant's conviction. It is significant that under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure sentence must be imposed "without unreasonable
delay." 47
Long delays do not make for sound sentencing and present
a particularly vexatious problem where the sentence is imposed
by a subsequent judge who did not hear the case. In State v.
Henderson48 the trial judge died after a verdict of aggravated
rape, but before sentence had been imposed. In holding that a
substitute judge could rule upon the defense motions for a new
trial and in arrest of judgment, and impose sentence, the Supreme Court stressed the fact that a complete transcription of
all testimony was available to the sentencing judge. It is significant that the sentence to be imposed was a mandatory death
sentence, that only questions of law were presented by the motion for a new trial, and that there was no evidence of unreasonable delay in sentencing. All of these facts supported the Supreme Court's decision upholding the sentencing by a substitute
judge who did not sit as judge during the trial of the case. If
there had been an unreasonable and lengthy postponement of
sentence, such as the two-year delay in State v. Rider, a more
serious problem might have been presented and defense counsel
might well have argued that the trial court had lost jurisdiction
to pass sentence. 49 The Supreme Court relied heavily upon wellreasoned Pennsylvania decisions, and qualified its approval of
a substitute sentencing judge by stating: " 'The sentencing or
suspension thereof of a person convicted of crime is a judicial
act of serious import in the administration of justice, and can
46.
47.
48.
49.

201 La. 733, 10 So. 2d 601 (1942).
FED. R. OF CRIM. PRO. rule 32(a) (1945).
243 La. 233, 142 So. 2d 407 (1962).
Mintie v. Biddle, 15 F.2d 931 (Cir. 1926).
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only be performed by the judge who tries the case, except in
cases of imperative necessity.' "5
CONCURRENT SENTENCES
In the case of multiple convictions a sentencing judge's authority to impose either concurrent or consecutive sentences is
well recognized. Often, however, the judge's intent in this regard is either not expressed or is expressed in a very confused
fashion. 51 In this situation the Louisiana jurisprudence has indicated that the obscurely stated sentences will be treated as
concurrent.5 2 A more difficult situation is presented where, as
in State ex rel. White v. Walker,53 the sentences were imposed
for convictions in different district courts. In White v. Walker
the Twenty-Eighth Judicial District Court had sentenced White
to two years on each of three counts, with the sentences to run
concurrently. Less than a month later White was sentenced by
the Fourth Judicial District Court to serve concurrent sentences
of one year in the state penitentiary on each of three counts.
The Fourth Judicial District Court sentences made no reference to those previously imposed by the Twenty-Eighth Judicial
District. In holding that all of the sentences were satisfied
after service of two years in the state penitentiary the Louisiana
Supreme Court applied the general rule "that sentences imposed
in the same jurisdiction to be served at the same penal institution run concurrently, even though they are imposed at different
times and by different courts, in the absence of statute or contrary provisions in the sentence. '5 4 The Supreme Court indicated, by way of dictum, that the inference that the trial judge
intended the sentences to run concurrently with prior sentences
imposed by another court, would not apply if the state made an
affirmative showing that the judge was without knowledge of
the prior sentences.5 5 It is submitted that if evidence is admitted
to show the judge's lack of knowledge of the prior sentences,
it should then also be admitted to show what the judge would
50. 243 La. 233, 241, 142 So. 2d 407, 409, quoting from Pennsylvania v.
Thompson, 328 Pa. 27, 195 Atl. 115 (1937).
51. "One of the knottiest problems of criminal procedure is how to tell when
sentences are concurrent and when consecutive." ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 575 (1947).
52. State v. Rider, 201 La. 733, 10 So. 2d 601 (1942). Accord, People v.
Ezell, 15 Ill. App. 298 (1910); Breton v. Petitioner, 93 Me. 39 (1899); In re
Black, 162 N.C. 457 (1913) ; State v. McKellar, 85 S.C. 236 (1909).
53. 244 La. 440, 152 So. 2d 552 (1963).
54. Id. at 444, 152 So. 2d at 554.

55. Ibid.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIV

have done if he had such knowledge, i.e., whether he would have
ordered the sentences to run concurrently or consecutively with
the prior sentences of the other court. In the absence of such a
showing, it would probably be appropriate to resolve the doubt
in favor of concurrent sentences.
LIMITATION ON INDIGENT DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO COMPLETE
TRANSCRIPTION OF THE EVIDENCE

A motion for a new trial on the ground that "the verdict is
contrary to the law and the evidence" 6 ordinarily presents a

5 7
question of fact which is not reviewable by the Supreme Court.
However, it is well settled when there is a complete lack of
evidence to support proof of an essential element of the crime,

a question of law is presented and the Supreme Court will reverse the conviction." The "no evidence" issue is presented
for appellate review by a bill of exceptions reserved to the overruling of a motion for a new trial, attaching thereto all of the
evidence introduced in the case or, in lieu thereof, the facts
recited by the trial judge in passing on the motion. 59 In such
cases a serious problem is presented by reason of the failure of
Louisiana law 60 to provide a free transcript of the evidence
for an indigent defendant who appeals and is claiming that
there is "no evidence" of an essential element of the crime. The
United States Supreme Court, in Griffin v. Illinois, held that
for a state to deny an indigent defendant a free transcript of

the evidence which is essential to an adequate appeal amounts
to a denial of "equal protection" of the laws. 61 The court pointed
56. LA. R.S. 15:509(1) (1950).
57. The Louisiana Supreme Court is without jurisdiction to review the facts
in a criminal case. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 7.
58. For an analysis and review of cases in point see Hebert, How Much Evidence is Some Evidence, 19 LA. L. REV. 843 (1959). See also State v. Linkletter,
239 La. 1000, 120 So. 2d 835 (1960).
59. State v. Laborde, 234 La. 28, 99 So. 2d 11, 12 (1958).
60. LA. R.S. 15:500 (1950) concludes that the defendant ". . . cannot require
that any evidence be taken down that appertains to guilt or innocence." R.S.
15:555 provides that the testimony of witnesses on the question of guilt or innocence may be transcribed when the accused "shall pay for the same."
61. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Mr. Justice Black stated: "Plainly the ability to
pay cost in advance bears no rational relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence and could not be used as an excuse to deprive a defendant of a fair trial
• . . to deny adequate review to the poor means that many of them may lose
their life, liberty or property because of unjust convictions which appellate courts
would set aside. Many states have recognized this and provided aid for convicted
defendants who have a right to appeal and need a transcript but are unable to
pay for it. A few have not. Such a denial is a misfit in a country dedicated to
affording equal justice to all . . . . There can be no equal justice where the kind
of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has." Two excellent discussions of the implications and effect of Griffin, found in 25 U. Cn1. L. REv.

1964]

PROCEDURE

out that a defendant does not have a right of appeal, but once
a state grants an appeal, it cannot discriminate against a defendant because of his inability to pay essential costs.
In essence, the true basis of the indigent defendant's right
to a free transcript of the testimony adduced at the trial should
63
be that it is needed for an adequate appeal.6 State v. Bueche
points the way to an appropriate, and very logical, limitation
upon the indigent appellant's right to a complete transcript of
the evidence when he appeals from the overruling of a motion
for a new trial on the ground that "the verdict is contrary to
the law and the evidence." In that case, the defendant, an indigent, was indicted for murder and convicted of manslaughter.
"After trial but before sentence ... the accused filed a motion
to ... have the entire testimony taken at the trial transcribed
at the expense of the State and parish in order that the testimony might be attached to a motion for a new trial" on the
ground "that there was a complete lack of evidence to support
the proof essential to a valid conviction of manslaughter. The
motion to have the testimony transcribed was denied." Counsel
for the defendant urged that "the due process clause of the
Federal constitution as interpreted in Griffin v. Illinois . . . is
the paramount law of the land and that decision requires that
an indigent accused, under the circumstances of this case, be
provided with a transcript of the testimony at the expense of
the State." Justice Summers, writing for a unanimous court,
stated:
"...we find it unnecessary to pursue these contentions inasmuch as the accused in his motion for a new trial did not
allege what essential element or elements of the crime were
not supported by proof. The motion being deficient in this
respect even though the evidence were attached thereto, it
would not be subject to review by this court. The general
allegation contained in that motion 'that there was a complete lack of evidence to support the proof essential to a
valid conviction of manslaughter' without pointing out
are Griffin v. Illinois, at p. 143, by Stanley E. Qua, former Chief Justice of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court; and Griffin v. Illinois: Antecedents and Aftermath, at p. 151, by Francis A. Allen, University of Chicago Law School.
62. State v. Rideau, 242 La. 431, 137 So. 2d 283 (1962), discussed in 23 LA.
L. REV. 405 (1963).
63. 243 La. 160, 142 So. 2d 381 (1962).
64. Id. at 182, 142 So. 2d at 389.
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wherein the proof was wanting presents nothing for review
by this court."' 5
It is a logical requirement, for the Supreme Court's review of
the trial judge's refusal to grant a new trial because the verdict
is contrary to the law and the evidence, that the appellant shall
specify the element or elements of the crime which are not supported by proof.

EVIDENCE
George W. Pugh*
EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

In 1961, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the landmark decision of Mapp v. Ohio,' held that "all evidence obtained
by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by
that same authority, inadmissible in a state court. ' 2 Amplifying
its holding, the Court in the Mapp case went on to state: "Since
the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared
enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same
sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government. 1 3 The Mapp decision is, of course, of extreme importance,
particularly in jurisdictions such as Louisiana, 4 which in preMapp days had rejected the so-called "exclusionary rule."
In four cases decided during the past term, 5 the first decisions in what no doubt will be a very long line of cases, the
Louisiana Supreme Court was called upon to consider the admissibility of evidence obtained as the result of allegedly illegal
searches and seizures. Although fully recognizing the importance and binding effect of Mapp v. Ohio, the Louisiana Supreme
65. Id. at 183, 142 So. 2d at 390.

*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. Id. at 655.
3. Ibid.
4. For a citation of Louisiana's prior jurisprudence in this connection, see
State v. Calascione, 243 La. 993, 997, 149 So. 2d 417, 418-19 (1963).
5. State v. Aias, 243 La. 946, 149 So. 2d 400 (1963); State v. Calascione,
243 La. 993, 149 So. 2d 417 (1963) ; State v. Cade, 244 La. 534, 153 So. 2d 382
(1963) ; and State v. Pennington, 244 La. 650, 153 So. 2d 876 (1963).

